We study a recent merit-based financial program for the poor in Colombia. We exploit sharp eligibility rules in household wealth and standardized test scores to identify the causal effect of financial aid on postsecondary enrollment and academic performance. We find large positive effects on postsecondary enrollment on both the extensive and intensive margins. Immediate enrollment doubled among eligible students, making the SES gap in enrollment disappear among top students. At the intensive margin, the program shifted students from low-quality institutions into higher-quality institutions, and from public to private colleges. We also observe significant general equilibrium effects in secondary and postsecondary education. The program promoted class diversity at top private schools, and significantly raised student quality at these institutions (with a smaller loss in lowquality and possibly public high-quality institutions). Demand for top private education shifted to the right, driving admission rates downward and increasing entry competition at these institutions, thus raising stratification by ability. However, program beneficiaries did not fully crowd out high-SES students from top private schools because supply also expanded. Finally, the program seems to have raised high school exit test performance among recent cohorts with relatively poor backgrounds.
Introduction
The rising higher education premium observed in many countries suggests that college is increasingly important to financial wellbeing. Overall, however, there is clear evidence that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are severely underrepresented in the post-secondary pipeline and particularly at top schools. Recent data from the United States show that only 3.8 percent of students in Ivy League colleges come from the lowest quintile of the income distribution (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner and Yagan, 2017) , despite the fact that nearly 17 percent of the top decile ACT or SAT I test-takers come from this group (Hoxby and Avery, 2013) . This underrepresentation of low-income students at top universities is also evident in developing countries. In Colombia, for instance, less than 1.5 percent of low-SES students immediately enrolled in quality postsecondary education in 2014, compared to 44.2 percent of their high-SES counterparts.
This raises concerns about the role of higher education in promoting social mobility and reducing intergenerational inequality. Moreover, the underrepresentation of low-income, highachievers in top colleges is puzzling for several reasons. Generous financial aid -which makes top institutions less costly than lower-quality alternatives -has not closed the socioeconomic status (SES) enrollment gap at top schools. In fact, this gap has persisted despite a plethora of alternative initiatives, such as class-based affirmative action (Alon and Malamud, 2014; Kahlenberg, 2014) , information provision Hoxby and Avery, 2013) , intensive college counseling (Castleman and Goodman, 2017) , aid in application processes (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos and Sanbonmatsu, 2012) , reduction in application costs (Avery, Hoxby, Jackson, Burek, Pope and Raman, 2006; Pallais, 2015) , and making college entry exams mandatory (Goodman, 2016) . Moreover, while the provision of financial aid has been a benchmark policy in the U.S. for decades, similar efforts are a recent phenomenon in the developing world. The scarce available evidence suggests that financial aid take-up is low among poor, high-achieving students and does not increase their attendance in top quality programs in these countries (Beyer, Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2015; Melguizo, Sanchez and Velasco, 2016) .
In this paper, we explore the short-run causal impacts of a novel financial aid program that targets this specific group of low-income, high achieving students: Ser Pilo Paga (henceforth SPP) in Colombia. SPP is a publicly funded financial aid program that covers the full tuition cost of attending a four-or five-year undergraduate, degree-awarding program at any top-quality university in Colombia. To become eligible, applicants must fulfill three requirements. First, they must score at or above the 90th percentile in the national high school exit standardized test, SABER 11. Second, they must come from disadvantaged households, as measures by their SISBEN wealth index. Third, they must be accepted in any of the "high"-quality universities in the country, as accredited by the central government. The program was introduced by surprise in October 2014 and, since then, it has awarded almost 10,000 scholarship-loans on a yearly basis. This amounts to one-third of high school seniors immediately accessing top-tier universities in Colombia. Its large scale, coupled with an immense advertisement campaign led by the government, has made SPP one of the most popular social programs in the country today.
Using administrative census data, we exploit SPP's sharp eligibility rules in household wealth and standardized test scores to identify the program's causal intended impacts on immediate postsecondary enrollment on eligible students and recipients. We find that SPP had significant positive impacts on both the extensive and intensive margins. Using SABER 11 as the running variable, the financial aid program almost doubled immediate enrollment in postsecondary education among eligible students. Impacts using the SISBEN score as the running variable are quantitatively smaller, at around 50 percent of the control mean. Given incomplete program take-up, local average treatment effects (LATE) estimates are substantially higher, at around 164 percent and 81 percent, respectively. Moreover, the program shifted enrollment from non-accredited to accredited institutions, which have the highest returns to schooling investments (Camacho, Messina and Uribe, 2016; MacLeod, Riehl, Saavedra and Urquiola, 2017) . Enrollment in non-accredited schools fell between 55.6 and 58.3 percent among eligible students, while enrollment in accredited schools increased between 148.3 and 441.5 percent. Importantly, the program shifted students from public to private schools: enrollment in private institutions increased between 230.6 and 295.6 percent among eligible students, while that in public institutions fell between 37.1 and 51.8 percent. This is not explained by differential quality accreditation status. Instead, and consistent with previous literature (Riehl, Saavedra and Urquiola, 2016) , our survey evidence suggests it is a result of students' perception of private institutions as being more prestigious and producing greater value added -broadly definedfor students.
To estimate the causal impact of SPP on student performance in college, we compare program beneficiaries with classmates of similar characteristics. We find that SPP recipients are 18 percent less likely to drop out during their freshmen year. These estimates are robust to instrumenting SPP recipiency status with program eligibility. We also find that SPP recipients are 2.3 percent more likely to fail a course during their freshmen year, a result that is robust to adjusting for selection bias due to differential attrition between treated and control groups. These generally positive early academic outcomes are congruent with evidence for high-achieving, low-income students attending top higher education institutions in other settings (Alon and Malamud, 2014) .
Further, the substantial expansion of immediate enrollment had significant broader impacts in secondary and postsecondary education in Colombia. To explore these general equilibrium effects, we expand our analysis to the universe of high school test-takers and postsecondary attendees before and after the program was implemented. We find that the program generated substantial equity gains, with the SES enrollment gap virtually disappearing among students in the top test score decile in just one year. Not surprisingly, top private institutions also became substantially more diverse, with the share of low-SES students increasing by more than 100 percent at some institutions.
These equity gains might not translate into net social gains if seats at top universities were fixed. We find evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that there is a zero-sum admission game at top quality universities in the short run. In fact, the newfound possibility of a tuitionfree college experience skyrocketed applications at top-ranked private schools, driving admission rates down and making these institutions substantially more selective. Importantly though, the supply of private accredited education somewhat expanded in response to this shift in demand, so that low-SES students only partially crowded out higher SES students from high quality postsecondary education. We do observe however an important concentration of high performing students in these private institutions with a corresponding decrease in the ability of newly admitted students in public and non-accredited institutions.
Finally, we find that the implementation of SPP has coincided with a rise in test performance among younger, low-SES high school students. Since the program's announcement, SABER 11 test score distribution has shifted to the right, with improvements concentrating in students belonging to the top and lowest socioeconomic strata. Yet, the impact has been strongest for some low-SES individuals: students from the bottom two socioeconomic strata have crowded out those from the richest strata at the top of the test score distribution. Although available data does not allow us to distinguish whether this increase in test performance is associated with overall improved learning or simply better preparation for the test, existing evidence suggests there is a positive correlation between SABER 11 scores and labor market outcomeseven after controlling for baseline individual and college characteristics (MacLeod et al., 2017) . This suggests SPP could bring further positive impacts in the future.
Our work contributes to the burgeoning literature that evaluates the impact of need-and merit-based financial aid on outcomes related to enrollment and performance, both in developed countries (Angrist, Autor, Hudson and Pallais, 2014, 2016; Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano and Sacerdote, 2016; Castleman and Long, 2015; Fack and Grenet, 2015; Marx and Turner, 2015) and developing countries (Melguizo et al., 2016; Solis, 2017) . Our policy experiment differs from these initiatives, with our potential eligible population ranking higher on the test score distribution than most students traditionally affected by financial aid. Moreover, through a careful program design, this financial aid program eliminated both the extensive and intensive socioeconomic gaps in higher education avoiding problems associated with mismatch (Bowen, Chingos and MacPherson, 2009; Dillon and Smith, 2017; Goodman, Hurwitz and Smith, 2017; Hoxby and Avery, 2013) .
Unlike previous studies that only analyze the intended impacts that such programs have on their direct beneficiaries, we go a step further and analyze the unintended consequences it has brought to secondary and postsecondary education in Colombia. To the best of our knowledge, no study has thus far addressed the general equilibrium impacts that financial aid programs might bring. Our work is thus also related to the literature on school vouchers, particularly research analyzing the effect they have on benefited individuals as well as the impact of nonrandom migration of students from public to private schools on aggregate educational performance (Epple, Romano and Urquiola, 2017; Urquiola, 2016) . We contribute to this literature by offering a case of a voucher in postsecondary education that leads to greater stratification by ability, pressuring some schools to become more efficient to attract high-ability students.
We caution that this strong response to financial aid in Colombia might not translate to other settings. The initial enrollment gap by SES is particularly wide in Colombia relative to other countries: the ratio in years of education between the top and bottom income quintiles is higher in Colombia than in any other Latin American country.
1 Moreover, ex-ante severe segregation in postsecondary education due to costly top-ranked private institutions, coupled with a shortage of access to credit for low-income individuals, implies that financial aid will have the largest impact in these settings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional background and describes in detail the financial aid program. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 discusses the short-run causal intended impacts of SPP using a regression discontinuity methodology. Section 5 discusses the general equilibrium effects of this program. Section 6 provides a cost-benefit analysis. Section 7 concludes.
Background Higher Education in Colombia
The tertiary admissions process in Colombia starts with SABER 11, the national standardized high school exit exam. SABER 11 is generally analogous to the SAT in the U.S., but it is taken by more than 90 percent of high school seniors regardless of whether they intend to apply to postsecondary institutions. High school seniors take the exam in either the spring or the fall semester according to their graduation date (there are two graduating cohorts); public school seniors take the exam in the fall semester.
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SABER 11 plays a larger role in admissions in Colombia than the SAT does in the U.S., with nearly four-fifths of tertiary institutions using SABER 11 as an admission criterion (OECD and The World Bank, 2012) and many schools awarding admission offers solely based on performance in this exam. College applications and admissions are decentralized and major-specific; prospective students apply to a college-major pair. Finally, college seniors are required to take a field-specific college exit exam called SABER PRO.
Colombian universities award the equivalent of U.S. bachelors degrees after four or five years of study. Most top-ranked tertiary institutions in the country are private.
3 Private universities in Colombia are expensive even by international standards (OECD and The World Bank, 2012), with tuition fees being more than eightfold that of their public counterparts (MEN 2016) , which are heavily subsidized and offer substantial discounts to low-SES students. As a result, sorting into private colleges is strongly defined by the tuition rates they charge (Riehl et al., 2016) .
Despite progress in the past decades, educational credit markets and financial aid mechanisms are substantially less developed in Colombia than in the U.S.; less than 10 percent of students have a loan in Colombia versus 35 percent in the U.S. (OECD and The World Bank, 2012; Sanchez and Velasco, 2014) . Moreover, the well-known credit ACCES program reaches only a fraction of low-income students, which leaves the vast majority of students from disadvantaged backgrounds unable to afford attendance costs at postsecondary institutions. As a result, high direct college costs, coupled with limited mechanisms for financing the full cost of college, squeeze poor students out of collegiate opportunities, particularly at selective schools.
While gross enrollment rates have increased significantly, from 31.6 percent in 2007 to 49.4 percent in 2015, most of this increase has been due to the expansion of low-quality programs in non-accredited institutions, with questionable impacts on academic performance and future job prospects (Camacho et al., 2016) . 4 In practice, most low-income students resort to these low-quality institutions, leading to a severe de facto segregation in postsecondary education.
2 Less than 15 percent of all high school graduates attend a school with the same calendar as the United States (Fall to Spring), most of which are elite private schools. 3 The official ranking done by the Ministry of Education is available here [accessed January 12, 2017] . 4 The Ministry of Education's National Accreditation Council (CNA, for its Spanish accronym) is the organism in charge of evaluating higher education in Colombia. Quality accreditation is awarded after CNA evaluates the program or the institution using a set methodology with specific quality criteria. Accreditation can be program-specific (e.g., the Economics undergraduate program at Externado University) and/or institutional (e.g., Externado University); the latter encompassing the former. By December 2016, 46 of the roughly 300 higher education institutions in Colombia had received quality accreditation. Institutional accreditation is closely related to university ranking: 19 of the top 20 institutions have quality accreditation (MEN, 2016) .
Ser Pilo Paga financial aid program
In light of this, the Santos administration created SPP, a merit-based financial aid program for the poor. 5 Announced on October 1st, 2014, the administration vowed to benefit 10,000 students every year, for a total of 40,000 beneficiaries by 2018 (henceforth referred to as "Pilos"). The loans, which become forgivable upon graduation, cover tuition fees at any one of the 33 universities with high quality accreditation and in any major of their choice. In addition, Pilos receive a biannual stipend of between one and four times the minimum wage, depending on whether or not she migrated to a different metropolitan area to attend college.
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To become eligible, applicants must satisfy three conditions. First, they must score in the top 9 percent of all high school seniors taking SABER 11 in the fall semester. In 2014, this meant obtaining a score of at least 310/500 (Figure 1, Panel A) . This SABER 11 threshold would increase to 318/500 in 2015, and further 348/500 in 2016. Second, they must come from a disadvantaged household and have a SISBEN index -a household wealth index used to target social programs -below a cut-off, which varies with geographic location: 57.21 in the 14 main metropolitan areas;
7 56.32 in other urban areas; and 40.75 in rural areas ( Figure 1 , Panel B). Lastly, applicants must have an admission offer from an accredited "high quality" university, as accredited by the Ministry of Education. 5 The program's name can be attributed two complementary meanings. For Colombians, the word "Pilo" is used to describe an individual who is bright or hardworking. "Paga" means to pay off. Hence, "Ser Pilo Paga" can be translated as "it pays off to be bright or hardworking". 6 In addition to this subsidy, Pilos may receive a biannual subsidy of COP $800,000 pesos (US $320) awarded by the National Planning Department upon completion of the academic semester, and an additional COP $200,000 per semester if their college GPA is 3.5/5.0 or above. Furthermore, Pilos often benefited from additional in-kind subsidies offered by receiving institutions (e.g. free photocopies, reduced lunch fees). 7 The 14 main metropolitan areas are Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Ibagué, Pereira, Villavicencio, Pasto, Montería, Manizales, and Santa Marta. 
Data
We use administrative data from five main sources and survey data specially collected for the impact evaluation of SPP. First, we use data from the Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educación Superior (ICFES, for its Spanish acronym), the institution in charge of standardized testing in Colombia. This dataset contains data from the universe of SABER 11 test takers in the fall semesters of 2013, 2014, and 2015. Specifically, it provides test scores results, as well as socioeconomic and demographic data (e.g., socioeconomic stratum, parental education, municipality of residence). ICFES data is then merged with data from the Department of National Planning (henceforth DNP), which contains SISBEN scores. Together, these two sources allow the identification of the eligible population, i.e., students with a test score above the cut-off and wealth index below the geographic thresholds.
Third, we use the Ministry of Education's Sistema para la Prevención de la Educación Superior (SPADIES, for its Spanish acronym), which tracks students along the postsecondary education system. We use SPADIES data from 2014 to 2016, which provides a wealth of information on student characteristics, including their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, enrollment status, graduation or dropout date, major of study, and institution. These data cover roughly 90 percent of all postsecondary enrollees; information from a handful of institutions is omitted due to poor and inconsistent reporting. Fifth, we use data from ICETEX, the institution that manages national and international scholarships and grants for post-baccalaureate programs -including SPP -on behalf of public and private organizations. This data provides information on Pilos as well as beneficiaries from other financial aid programs.
We also use survey data collected from 1,479 SISBEN-eligible individuals who took SABER 11 in Fall 2015, and scored slightly above or below the SABER 11 eligibility threshold. Finally, we use administrative data from the Ministry of Education as well as admission rate data from several universities in Colombia. 4 Intended Short-Run Direct Impacts
RD Design
To estimate the causal impact of SPP on short-run outcomes (e.g., access to higher education), we exploit the SABER 11 and SISBEN cutoffs using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Because the probability of receiving SPP needs not change from 0 to 1 at the eligibility thresholds, we will use a fuzzy RD.
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9 We prefer to use admission rate data provided specially to us by selected institutions in lieu of that from the national higher education information system (SNIES), due to inconsistent reporting undermining data quality. 10 The fuzzy RD design occurs when the discontinuous assignment rule does not result in perfect compliancethat is, when P (D i = 1|Z i = 1) < 1 and/or when P (
The basic setup is the following. Let Z i = 1(R i > k) be an indicator for SPP eligibility, where k is the point of a discontinuous assignment rule (e.g., SABER 11 score, SISBEN). Denote D i as an indicator for whether an individual is a beneficiary of SPP. Then the fuzzy RD design requires that lim r↑k P (
, that is, that there is a discontinuity in the probability of assignment, though this discontinuity need not result in full take-up of the treatment. The resulting RD-IV estimand can be written in simple Wald form as:
The causal estimand identified by the RD-IV estimator is a type of LATE:
where the LATE is local not only to the group of compliers but the group who have R i = k. Note that, since eligibility depends on both poverty and test score discontinuities, we can separately identify two types of compliers: SISBEN-eligible students around the SABER 11 cutoff ( To understand how the population directly affected by this policy compares to the typical high school senior in Colombia, Table A .1 and A.2 in the Appendix characterize the sample population as well as the subpopulations of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers using SABER 11 and SISBEN as the running variables, respectively (Abadie, 2002; Imbens and Rubin, 1997) . Table A .1 shows that, relative to the universe of test-takers (Column 1), SISBEN-eligible students have more siblings, less educated parents, lower socioeconomic stratum, are less likely to attend high school full time, and are less likely to attend private high schools (Column 2). Using SABER 11 as the running variable, students scoring close to the SABER 11 cutoff (i.e., relatively high performers) are more likely to be male, young, and non-ethnic minorities (Column 3). They are more likely to be a full-time high school student at a private high school and come from a smaller, more educated, and relatively wealthier family. Compliers are very similar in observable characteristics to other students within the SABER 11 bandwidth (Column 4), but have somewhat more educated parents. Relative to compliers, never-takers are more likely to be male, employed, and attend private, full-day high schools (Column 5). Given there are no SPP recipients with test scores below the cutoffs, there are no always takers using SABER 11 as the running variable (Column 6).
We will focus our analysis on the first cohort of Pilos, that is, those who graduated high school late November or early December in 2014 and began college in Spring 2015. We avoid pooling different cohorts of SPP beneficiaries and focus on the first cohort of SPP instead for three main reasons. First, high school seniors sitting for SABER 11 after the announcement of SPP have incentives to exert more effort and perform better in this test. Second, anecdotal evidence suggests the number of households asking for SISBEN evaluations from local authorities has increased substantially since Spring 2015. Third, because public knowledge of SPP has increased over time, the program's take-up rate (i.e., the share of eligible students who become SPP beneficiaries) is higher in the most recent cohorts (see DNP, CNC and de Los-Andes (2016)). These three facts raise concern for endogeneity due to time-varying unobservables and complicate pooling different cohorts.
We use data-driven (that is, fully automatic) local-polynomial-based robust inference procedures through "rdrobust". This command implements the bias-corrected inference procedure proposed by Cattaneo, Calonico and Titiunik (2014) , which is robust to "large" bandwidth choices. It also offers robust bias-corrected confidence intervals for average treatment effects at the cutoff based on the recent work by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Cattaneo et al. (2014) .
Validity of the RD Design
Before we turn to our main results, we provide evidence that the discontinuities in SPP eligibility can serve to produce unbiased estimates of the effects of this financial aid program. The three key assumptions for the validity of the RD design are: (i) that the predicted discontinuity creates a large change in assignment to treatment as a function of the running variable; (ii) any observed differences in the neighborhood of the discontinuity occur only as a result of the differences in the running variables; and (iii) that there is no evidence of manipulation in assignment to treatment near the discontinuity. We address each of these assumptions in turn. Table A. 3 in the Appendix, shows the sharp eligibility rules; since no student below the cutoff was assigned to treatment, P (D i = 1|Z i = 0) = 0 (i.e., there are no always-takers). The eligibility cutoffs increase assignment to SPP by 54.1 percentage points when using SABER 11 as the running variable and 62.4 percentage points when using SISBEN as the running variable. Thus, although there is a discontinuity in the probability of assignment, the eligibility cutoffs do not deterministically predict treatment assignment because there is incomplete take-up of treatment. One-side noncompliance was due in large part to the short timespan between the announcement of SPP and the deadline to apply to accredited universities (in many cases, a couple of weeks), as suggested by qualitative field evidence from DNP et al. (2016) .
Second, we expect the behavior of individuals to be correlated with Z i only because of its correlation with D i (i.e., the exclusion restriction necessary for Z i to be a valid instrument for D i ). We test this possibility by examining whether observable covariates are different on either side of the discontinuity point (see Tables A .4 and A.6 in the Appendix). The results suggest there is balance in most of the 25 covariates. Specifically, using SABER 11 (SISBEN) as the running variable, there is balance in 23 (19) of the 25 baseline charateristics. To increase precision of the RD treatment effect estimator, we regression-adjust these differences by including the baseline characteristics where there is imbalance between treatment and control.
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As a robustness check, we perform a dimension reduction exercise and confirm that imbalance in baseline covariates cannot explain the large impacts we see on access to postsecondary education (see Table A .8 in the Appendix). Lastly, an additional assumption often employed in RD is no selective sorting across the treatment threshold. The skeptical econometrician might fear that students have control over test scores and/or wealth scores and behave strategically so as to ensure that they are just above or below the thresholds, thereby inducing self-selection or nonrandom sorting of students across the discontinuity point and into "control" and "treatment" status.
We argue against this concern in the case of SPP. First, SPP was announced in October 1, 2014, that is, almost two months after students took SABER 11. Thus, students did not know the eligibility cutoff -nor in fact the mere existence of this financial aid program-at the moment they sat for the exam. Moreover, once the program and eligibility conditions were announced, students could not go back in time and re-take SABER 11 to become eligible. Similar arguments regarding the SISBEN score can be brought forward: household SISBEN scores were assigned well before the program was announced. Even though reclassifications are possible, neither students nor their families had the time to ask for re-assessments before the SPP application deadline in November 2014 (this may no longer be the case for more recent cohorts). Finally, ICFES reformed SABER 11 in Fall 2014 such that students taking the exam that semester were not familiar with the scoring mechanism ex-ante. We thus conclude that our identifying assumption that the running variables are quasi-randomly assigned close to the SPP eligibility cutoffs is a plausible one.
To formally test for manipulation of the running variable, we use the recent local polynomial density estimator proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2016a,b) . Unlike McCrary (2008) , this estimator does not require pre-binning of the data, relying on simple weighting schemes (i.e., kernel functions). It also does not require preliminary tuning and smoothing parameter choices when implemented, and reduces boundary bias.
12 The resulting robust-corrected p-values are 0.218 with SABER 11 as R i , and 0.436 with SISBEN as R i (see Table A .9 in the Appendix). This suggests there is no statistical evidence of systematic manipulation of the running variable.
We thus conclude that there is balance in baseline covariates along the eligibility discontinuities and that there is no manipulation of the running variable around these cutoffs. This gives strengths to our identifying assumption of having a valid RD design.
Results
Extensive and intensive margin impacts on access to higher education Figure 4 shows the probability of immediate enrollment in any postsecondary using SABER 11 (Panel A) and SISBEN (Panel B) as the running variables. The dots are cell means, and the lines are fitted values from a regression of higher education enrollment on a fourth-order polynomial in the score estimated separately on either side of the passing cutoff. It is clear from both panels that, as expected, SPP had an important and significant impact on immediate postsecondary education enrollment rates of eligible students. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 report intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the enrollment effects of SPP using SABER 11 and SISBEN cutoffs, and Columns (2) and (4) report the corresponding instrumental variable estimates, which scale the ITT estimates by the first stage estimates. These estimates can be interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE) for "compliers" -individuals who respond to SPP eligibility by becoming a beneficiary of this program. Moreover, in the absence of always-takers, the average effect for compliers (LATE) is equal to the average effect for the treated (TOT), since any student receiving the treatment is by definition a complier (Bloom, 1984) . At the SABER 11 threshold, reduced-form estimates show that the likelihood that a student enrolls in higher education immediately after graduating high school increased by 32.6 percentage points. The implied LATE results suggest a 60.5 percentage point increase in enrollment. At the SISBEN threshold, the ITT estimate suggests enrollment increased by 25.5 percentage points and the LATE estimate suggests a 41.2 percentage point increase. These are important impacts that amount to an increase in immediate enrollment of 90 percent for eligible students and 167 percent for compliers. Notes: The running variable is SABER 11 score in columns (1) and (2), and SISBEN score in columns (3) and (4) . Columns (1) and (2) include dummies for mother's education and stratum 4 as controls, and columns (3) and (4) include controls for family size and dummies for parental secondary and higher education, morning school schedule and weekend school schedule. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
Sources: Authors calculations based on ICFES, DNP, MEN, and SPADIES (2016).
As a robustness check, we conduct a placebo test. Intuitively, for RD design to identify the causal impact of SPP on the outcomes of interest, then the running variables R i cannot affect the outcome of interest Y i in the absence of SPP. Thus, we can test for a discontinuity in enrollment in higher education around the equivalent SABER 11 and SISBEN eligibility thresholds among students that took SABER 11 in Fall 2013, i.e., a year before SPP was created. The absence of a discontinuity in Figure 5 lends credence to the identifying assumption, that is, that the jump in enrollment in higher education seen in Figure 4 is caused by SPP.
A crucial characteristic of the SPP program is that it restricts institutional choice to colleges awarded government quality accreditation in an effort to gear students towards institutions that have higher returns to schooling investment (Camacho et al., 2016) . Figure 6 plots enrollment in accredited (i.e., high quality) universities and non-accredited (i.e., low quality) universities by SABER 11 score (Panels A and C) and SISBEN score (Panels B and D). Results in Table  2 Notes: The running variable is SABER 11 score in columns (1)- (4), and SISBEN score in columns (5)- (8). Columns (1)- (4) include dummies for mother's education and stratum 4 as controls, and columns (5)- (8) include controls for family size and dummies for parental secondary and higher education, morning school schedule and weekend school schedule. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Even though SPP required students to be admitted in an accredited university, there was no restriction on whether it should be a public or a private institution. To understand whether SPP had an impact in this (intensive) margin, Figure 7 further decomposes enrollment by type of institution -public versus private -using SABER 11 score as the running variable among SISBEN-eligible individuals. ITT (LATE) estimates in Table 3 confirm that enrollment increased in private accredited institutions by 46.9 (86.5) percentage points and decreased in private non-accredited institutions by 6.5 (12.0) percentage points. In addition, enrollment decreased in public non-accredited institutions 8. 3 (15.3) percentage points, while enrollment in public accredited institutions was not affected. Results are quantitatively similar when using SISBEN as the running variable (Table 4) except that enrollment in public accredited institutions fell by 8.4 (13.5) percentage points. 13 This suggests that SPP induced eligible students to sort across institutions, particularly from non-accredited to accredited institutions -and possibly from public to private institutions. To explore what drives students to choose private institutions over public institutions in Colombia, we turn to survey data collected among SISBEN-eligible students who took SABER 11 in Fall 2015 and scored slightly above or below the SABER 11 eligibility cutoff. By Spring 2016 -the time of survey collection -around 68 percent of the 1,487 survey participants attended a postsecondary institution, and the survey asked them to report the main reasons they chose their institution.
14
The data reveal that the most important factor driving institutional choice is prestige (47.4 percent), second only to availability of preferred major. This is consistent with models in which applicants have endogenous tastes for colleges with good reputation, i.e., those with high-ability peers, because firms set their wages by inferring skill levels from the reputation of the college attended (see MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015) . Indeed, empirical evidence from Colombia suggests that college reputation determines initial wages as well as subsequent earnings growth (see Section 6 and MacLeod et al. (2017) ).
Importantly, prestige and academic quality are more frequent concerns for students attend-ing private (55.7 percent and 42.4 percent, respectively) versus public (36.8 percent and 27.0 percent, respectively) institutions, as are better job prospects (36.1 percent versus 18.1 percent, respectively), and better contacts (6.7 percent versus 4.5 percent, respectively). This is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting graduates from top private schools enjoy a wage premium over selective public schools, even when controlling for individual-level characteristics (e.g., SABER 11 score, SES) and college-level characteristics (see Riehl et al., 2016, and Section 6) . In contrast, affordability appears to be one of the most attractive features of public institution (31.2 percent versus only 9.1 percent among private enrollees), thus giving support to the argument that college costs are an important determinant of student sorting across schools.
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In sum, a higher demand for private postsecondary education seems to respond to the perception that private institutions are more reputable and produce greater value added -broadly defined -for students. Notes: The running variable is SABER 11 score. Controls include dummies for mother's higher education and stratum 4. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Sources: Authors' calculations based on ICFES, DNP, MEN, and SPADIES (2016). Notes: The running variable is SISBEN. Controls include family size, and dummies for parental secondary and higher education, morning school schedule and weekend school schedule. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Sources: Authors' calculations based on ICFES, DNP, MEN, and SPADIES (2016).
Academic performance of Pilos versus non-Pilos
The first cohort of Pilos began their undergraduate studies spring 2015. With the average length of a program being 4.5 years, degree completion outcomes will not become available before 2020. Instead, we observe two shorter-run measures of academic performance and persistence: the fraction of courses approved in freshman year, and whether the student dropped out by spring 2016.
We compare academic outcomes of Pilos and non-recipients of SPP (i.e., non-Pilos) using the following OLS regression:
where y imj is outcome y for student i in major m in institution j, P ilo imj is a dummy variable that turns 1 if a student is SPP beneficiary and 0 otherwise, δ mj are major-by-institution fixed effects, X imj is a vector of 25 baseline characteristics, and ε imj is a student-specific error term. Standard errors are clustered at the institution-by-major level.
Columns (1)- (4) in Table 5 show that, on average 22.6 percent of students are absent one year after beginning their undergraduate studies (standard deviation 41.8).
16 Pilos are 12.0 percentage points less likely to be absent than non-Pilos (Column 1). Because retention rates are higher in colleges attended by Pilos, Column 2 includes major-by-institution fixed effects. This reduces the magnitude of this coefficient, but not its statistical significance. Controlling for SABER 11 score further reduces the magnitude of the coefficient (Column 3). Finally, including baseline covariates -our preferred specification -suggests that Pilos are 4.0 percentage points less likely to drop out than non-Pilos (Column 4). On a mean of 22.1 percent, this implies Pilos are 18.1 percent less likely to drop out during their first year. This is likely a result of the program design, which requires beneficiaries to graduate from their program for the loan to become forgivable. Table 5 use as dependent variable the cumulative share of courses passed by spring 2016. On average, freshmen students in Spring 2015 passed 85.2 percent of their courses (standard deviation 19.8 percent). This share is 0.5 percentage points higher for Pilos than for non-Pilos (Column 1). Including major-by-college fixed effects reduces the magnitude of this coefficient (Column 2). Further, controlling for SABER 11 makes this coefficient switch sign and loose become significant significance (Column 3). Including a rich set of baseline controls suggests Pilos are 2 percentage points more likely to fail a course during their freshman year (Column 4). On a base of 85.3 percent, this implies a 2.3 percent lower performance. 16 The first-year retention rate in Colombia varies significantly by type of higher education institution, and is lower than the average retention rate in the United States. In 2015, the percentage of first-time, degreeseeking undergraduates retained was 77.1 percent at 4-year institutions in Colombia, 82.2 percent at accredited institutions, 75.4 percent at non-accredited institutions, 84.5 percent at private accredited institutions, and 78.6 percent at public accredited institutions (see Figure A. 3, Panel B, in the Appendix). In the U.S., data from the U.S. Department of Education suggest the percentage of first-time, full-time degree-seeking undergraduates retained at 4-year institutions was 80 percent from 2013 to 2014. For selective institutions (i.e., acceptance rate of 25 percent or below), this share is 96 percent at both public and private non-profit institutions. The second row in Table 5 treats SPP recipiency status as endogenous and instruments it using program eligibility (i.e., scoring above 310/500 in SABER 11 and having a SISBEN score below the cutoff). The resulting 2SLS estimates suggest that selection on unobservables does not drive our main results, namely that Pilos are less likely to drop out but more likely to fail courses. However, by construction, we observe course-passing information only for retained students. The differential non-random attrition from postsecondary education documented in Columns (1)- (4) may thus compromise the course-passing comparability of SPP recipients and nonrecipients, possibly generating selection bias. To deal with this issue, we follow Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Walters (2017) and Lee (2009) and formally assess the robustness of our results to selected attrition by constructing non-parametric bounds on the 2SLS estimate under a monotonicity assumption on the attrition process. The third row in Table 5 displays estimated bounds on 2SLS estimates for compliers. These bounds are tight around 2SLS estimates and suggest that adjustments for differential attrition do not overturn the conclusion that Pilos are 2 percent more likely to fail courses in their first year of college.
Columns (5)-(8) in

Unintended Short-Run General Equilibrium Impacts
To estimate the general equilibrium effects that SPP brought to the higher education system in Colombia, we no longer use the RD design as our identification strategy, but instead compare outcomes for the universe of test-takers before and after the program was implemented. Specifically, we use information from SABER 11 test-takers in the fall semesters of 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 -which amounts to more than 2.5 million students -and postsecondary students.
Higher competition for admission into accredited universities
The newfound possibility of a tuition-free college education boosted low-SES students' performance in SABER 11 and skyrocketed applications at accredited universities. Panel A in Figure  8 , which plots the probability distribution of socioeconomic strata for the top SABER 11 decile each year, suggests that the share of top performers from the lowest strata increased from 12. Moreover, it appears that students from the bottom two strata have crowded out higher-SES students in the last two years: the shares of top decile performers from strata 3 and 4 decreased by 13.3 percent and by 10.5 percent from strata 5 and 6. Tadeo Lozano) . 17 Importantly, this fall in admission rates at private accredited institutions stands in stark contrast with their public counterparts. For instance, at UNAL, Colombia's flagship public university, the number of applicants fell by 5 percent between 2014 and 2015. Private colleges expanded supply as a response to this shift in demand. Panel B in Figure  9 shows that the size of the entering cohort increased between 8.4 and 44.7 percent between 2014 and 2016. Note, however, that the slope of the curves flattens after 2015, suggesting a possible conscientious attempt on behalf of some elite colleges to restrict this increase in supply (see MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015) . 18 In any case, aggregate data suggest the number of high school seniors immediately enrolling in postsecondary education increased by 12.2 percent between 2014 and 2016, with private accredited schools representing 63.4 percent of that increase.
Notwithstanding this supply expansion, admission rates plummeted at most accredited institutions, with the fall being particularly severe at top-ranked universities: at Los Andes and Javeriana, admission rates fell by almost 50 percent and 35 percent in just two years, respectively ( Figure 9 , Panel C).
19 In contrast, the undergraduate admission rate at UNAL, Colombia's top public institution, increased from 8.3 percent in 2014 to 10.1 percent in 2015.
17 Using admissions microdata from a private accredited university in Bogota, Londono-Velez (2016) shows that the documented rise in applications after SPP is driven exclusively by low-SES applicants from the bottom socioeconomic strata. 18 MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) offer a model to explain why elite colleges have restricted supply in spite of increasing college applications. In their setup, asymmetric information about individual innate ability leads firms to set wages to expected skill conditional upon college reputation and an individual-specific measure of skill. As a response, college applicants display an endogenous taste for abler peers and colleges with good reputation. This provides schools with incentives to be selective and remain small. 19 Note also that universities are generally more selective in Bogota than elsewhere in the country: the admission rate in Spring 2014 was 57 percent in the University of Los Andes and 58 percent in Javeriana University versus 92 percent in EAFIT and 96 percent in EIA. Source: Authors' calculations using administrative data. Figure 10 plots the change in the probability of not attending and attending postsecondary education by SABER 11 decile and institution type between Spring 2014 and 2015. 20 The figure suggests there was little change for all but the top decile. Specifically, the probability of enrolling in a private and accredited institution increased by 12.7 percentage points for the top decile (see also Table A.12 in the Appendix). More than 71 percent of this increase comes from a decrease in the probability of not attending higher education while almost 26 percent is due to lower enrollment in non-accredited institutions. In contrast, enrollment at non-accredited institutions increased for all but the top decile students. + ij , where r ij is an indicator variable that turns 1 if student i enrolled in higher education institution j immediately after presenting SABER 11 and 0 otherwise, 1(Af ter) is a dummy that equals 1 in the period after SPP was implemented, T d i is a dummy that turns 1 if the student placed in decile d and 0 otherwise, and ij is an individual-specific error term. This identifies the change in enrollment rates by SABER 11 decile and type of institution between students who graduated from high school before and after SPP was in place. 21 Figure A that the probability of immediately accessing postsecondary education did not change significantly for Fall 2013 test-takers. In stark contrast, Fall 2014 test-takers -the first cohort exposed to SPP-were significantly more likely to immediately access higher education. Specifically, the probability of accessing private and accredited college education increased by 12.7 percentage points relative to the cohort two years prior. This trend was reinforced again for Fall 2015 test-takers in the top decile: relative to Fall 2012 test-takers, they were 10.6 percentage points more likely to access postsecondary education and 14.3 percentage points more likely to enroll in a private and accredited institution. Figure 11 plots the difference in mean SABER 11 score among freshmen students before and after SPP by institution. The figure suggests that average student quality significantly increased for most private accredited institutions (Panel A), with the magnitude of the impact being inversely proportional to the institutional ranking, as measured by the average quality of admitted students. 22 In contrast, average student quality decreased for most public accredited institutions (Panel B).
An increase in student quality at private accredited institutions
23
Together, Figure 10 and Figure 11 provide evidence of important compositional effects from non-random sorting of students from no postsecondary education and non-accredited education to private accredited institutions. As private accredited schools "cream skim" the most able students away from non-accredited institutions (and possibly public accredited institutions), increased sorting by ability raises stratification and widens the quality gap in equilibrium. Moreover, we can expect a positive peer externality for students attending private accredited institutions. The adverse peer effects on non-accredited and potentially public accredited institutions are likely to be non-negligible as well. Where did displaced applicants enroll?
With admission thresholds rising due to higher competition, marginal students were displaced from top schools. In the country's top-ranked university, 1,047 applicants whose test scores would have granted them admission in Spring 2014 were rejected in Spring 2015 as a result of the more selective cutoffs (see Figure 6 in Londono-Velez (2016)). Figure 12 tracks where these displaced students enrolled in Spring 2015, i.e., the semester immediately after presenting SABER 11. Panel A shows that around 30 percent of displaced students did not immediately enroll in any higher education institution in Colombia, with the remainder enrolling at institutions with significantly lower-quality students, according to their mean SABER 11 score before SPP. 24 Specifically, 17 percent of displaced students attended Bogota's second-best private institution, whose mean normalized SABER 11 score is 1.97 (i.e., a loss in peer quality of 1.09 points). Roughly 7 percent of displaced students attended an institution with a score of 1.87 (i.e., a loss in peer quality of 1.19 points). One-quarter of all displaced students belong to relatively wealthy households, i.e., strata 4, 5, or 6. Panel B restricts the sample to these relatively wealthy students and shows that 33.3 percent of them opted not to immediately enroll in higher education in Colombia, while 27.2 percent opted for the 7th ranked institution in the country.
How does this compare to successful applicants who would not have been admitted the following year due to the increase in cutoffs, that is, the would-be marginal applicants? Indeed, comparing the two cohorts is important because not all those who are admitted enroll. Specifically, Londono-Velez (2016) suggests that on average roughly 30 percent of admitted applicants enrolled at this university before SPP, and that those from strata 4-6 were twice as likely to enroll than those from strata 1-3. Thus, Figure 13 presents the difference in the frequency of marginal and would-be marginal applicants enrolled at each institution before and after SPP.
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The Figure suggests an increase in the number of students that did not immediately enroll in higher education and that enrolled in a lower-ranked institution.
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24 One third of those (immediately) crowded out from higher education re-applied to this same university, the overwhelming majority to no avail. By Fall 2016 (i.e., 1.5 years later), 70 percent were attending higher education, with all but three students attending lower-ranked schools. 25 There are 249 such would-be marginal applicants in Spring 2014. 26 Note that 40 percent of would-be marginal applicants come from relatively wealthy households (i.e., strata [4] [5] [6] . 
Class diversity at top-ranked private accredited institutions
The large influx of low-SES students at private accredited institutions promoted class diversity at top-ranked institutions. Figure 14 In fact, the overwhelming majority of private accredited institutions experienced a significant shift in class diversity. 27 In contrast, the share of low-SES freshmen students was relatively unaffected at public accredited institutions, whose traditional population is composed mostly of lower-and middle-class students. In fact, the share of students from the bottom two strata decreased by 3.0 percent at a top-ranked Bogota campus (Panel C), while it increased by only 6.3 percent at another flagship public institution (Panel D).
Importantly, the program leveled access to higher education for high-performing students from different SES backgrounds. Figure 15 presents the enrollment rate by strata among SABER 11-eligible students in 2014 (before SPP) and 2015 (after SPP). The figure suggests the equalizing impact of SPP is significant: the program increased the enrollment rate from 43.2 percent to 63.6 percent for the poorest individuals (stratum 1), that is, an increase of 47.2 percent. Moreover, the large SES gap in enrollment among top decile students in 2014 virtually disappears after only one year. 27 Londono-Velez (2016) explores the impact class diversity had on redistributive preferences at an elite college during this period. 28 Table A .13 in the Appendix decomposes the change in enrollment rates for each stratum by type of institution between 2014 and 2015. Overall, the table suggests that some relatively wealthy students might have been displaced from higher education in Colombia. 
Sluggish institutional response: accreditation status and tuition fees
As with many other voucher programs, institutions that are left out of the program are pressured to become more efficient. In the case of SPP, the requirement that students enroll at accredited institutions may put pressure on non-accredited institutions to receive this type of accreditation from the Ministry of Education (but whether or not this reflects an actual improvement in the quality of education provided remains to be seen). Figure 16 plots the number of accredited higher education institutions in the quarters leading to and after the announcement of SPP (the x-axis has been re-centered at 2014q3). The figure provides no evidence of a change in the trend after the announcement of SPP.
A final concern is whether the expansion of government-provided financial aid and the resulting higher demand for education has been captured (partly or entirely) by schools via tuition hikes, as predicted by the so-called Bennett Hypothesis.
29 Private institutions would be especially prone to have this behavioral response, as they have significantly more flexibility in setting their own tuition fees than their public counterparts. Interestingly, however, real tuition fees for entering, full-time undergraduate students at private accredited institutions have remained relatively stable throughout the period, increasing by 4.8 percent in 2010-11, 4.3 percent in 2011-12, 1.8 percent in 2012-13, 3.0 percent in 2013-14, 3 .1 percent in 2014-15, and 2.1 percent in 2015-16. We therefore do not yet find empirical evidence that aid increases feed tuition increases. 
Cost-Benefit Discussion
Using data on total payments in tuition fees to universities and maintenance subsidies to beneficiaries, Appendix Table A.14 presents the annual cost for the first cohort of Pilos in 2015 amounted to 135.4 billion pesos (USD 42.7 million), or 14.8 million pesos per capita (USD 4, 657) . This is around 4.2 percent of annual central government spending on higher education. Assuming annual dropout rate stabilizes at 2.32 percent after 2016, and given the average program is 9.5 semesters long, the cost of the full 4.5 years of study for the first cohort of Pilos reaches 598.9 billion pesos (USD 188.7 million), or 78.4 million (USD 24,691) per beneficiary. After this first cohort, and as a response to complaints that resources were disproportionately benefitting private institutions, the government appeased critics by paying public universities the marginal student cost instead of their tuition fee (artificially lower after public subsidies).
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This shrank the per student resource gap between public and private institutions, but raised the cost of the program to 913.8 billion (USD 287.9 million) pesos for this second cohort, that is, 94.7 million pesos per beneficiary (USD 29,845).
Since earnings are unavailable for our sample because Pilos have not yet graduated college, we project earnings impacts using income data from household surveys and social security contributions. We caution that our projections will produce reliable estimates of earnings impacts if the relationship between (type of) college attendance and earnigns is causal, a strong assumption that is not likely to hold due to selection into (type of) college. We complement our analysis with literature estimates that relate the type of college attended with later life outcomes, but this still leaves the important caveat that the treated populations from SPP are very different from that of previous studies, both in terms of SES and test scores. This becomes particularly relevant in contexts where elite colleges produces high-end labor market outcomes, but only for students from wealthy households (Zimmerman, 2016) . Moreover, the large unintended impacts documented in Section 5 could potentially also affect labor market outcomes for these cohorts. This implies that our cost-benefit discussion will be necessarily speculative, as the only way to 30 Note that the biannual marginal student cost is roughly similar in accredited private and public universities (see Table A .14). However, tuition fees at public institutions are significantly lower because they are subsidized by the central government. A direct implication is that the argument, often voiced by critics of SPP, that resources for SPP could have been used to benefit a larger number of students at public universities is not entirely accurate.
be sure of SPP's long-run effects is to directly measure long-run outcomes for SPP participants.
Our reduced form point estimate is that SPP eligibility raises enrollment in postsecondary education by 25.8 to 34.5 percentage points. Consider the strong assumption that the only impact of the program is to raise 30 of each 100 students from "no postsecondary education" to "accredited postsecondary education", thus ignoring any graduate degree or other unobserved effects. 31 We estimate that the average college graduate from an accredited institution in Colombia will earn 1.37 billion in 2015 pesos (USD 432,625) over the course of his/her lifetime, while the average high school graduate will earn 448,891,226 pesos (USD 141,428) .
32 To calculate the earnings gain of Pilos, we take into account the foregone earnings of attending a 4.5-year college (the average duration of a program attended by Pilos), as well as the monetary subsidies received by Pilos over the course of their studies. 33 We thus estimate that SPP might raise earnings by an annuity of 16,309,969 pesos (USD 5,139) for forty years for a net present value of around 382,703,013 pesos (USD 120,574) at a 5 percent interest rate. This significant premium reflects the fact that Colombia has the largest return to college education in Latin America, and the second largest wage gap between college-and high school-educated workers in the region.
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Moreover, we documented how students sorted into accredited postsecondary institutions, and especially top private institutions. Previous literature has shown that graduates from top private institutions enjoy a significant wage premium over both non-accredited institutions and selective public universities (Camacho et al., 2016; MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015; Riehl et al., 2016) . To estimate how much more are Pilos likely to earn by switching to top private accredited schools, we turn to administrative OLE data for 2008-2013 formal employees wages for 2001-2013 college graduates.
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Figure 17 plots the earnings profiles of college graduates by type of institution. Panel A plots mean log monthly real earnings separately for graduates from accredited and non-accredited institutions, while Panel B plots earnings profiles separately for college graduates from private and public accredited institutions.
36 Panel A illustrates the magnitude of the earnings gap between graduates from accredited and non-accredited institutions. It also shows that the slope of workers' earnings-experience profiles is higher for accredited than for non-accredited institutions, with the earnings gap more than doubling over the first nine years of experience.
31 See Appendix B for the list of assumptions made to obtain our estimates of earnings gain. 32 The average wage of a college graduate from an accredited institution is taken from the average monthly wage in 2013 of an individual graduating college in 2012, as recorded in OLE, weighted by the frequency of the institutions where Pilos enrolled and converted to 2015 pesos. 33 Our calculations likely underestimate the total amount of subsidies received by Pilos. First, DNP provided additional subsidies upon completion of the academic semester as well as for good academic performance. Second, some private institutions provided in-kind subsidies (e.g., food, photocopies, transportation). 34 The coefficient from the college dummy in a Mincer regression for men is 1.053 in Colombia compared to 1.004 in Costa Rica, 0.857 in Brazil, 0.851 in Chile, 0.719 in Mexico, 0.559 in Peru, and 0.417 in Argentina. Also, the ratio of hourly wages between workers with tertiary and secondary education is 2.82 in Brazil, 2.72 in Colombia, 2.61 in Mexico, 2.60 in Chile, 2.28 in Costa Rica, 1.7 in Peru, and 1.49 in Argentina (SEDLAC -CEDLAS and The World Bank). 35 We restrict our sample by excluding the following observations: (i) self-employed workers (whose wages we do not observe) and other non-employees; (ii) non-university degrees (e.g., technical or technological, specialization, masters, PhD); (iii) distance learning degrees; (iv) earnings after obtaining a second undergraduate degree or a graduate degree; (v) ages below 18 or above 35; (vi) more than 9 years of experience (there are very few individuals in our data with 10 or more years of experience, making these estimates very noisy); (vii) graduates from the National Appenticeship Service (SENA), a public vocational training school; and (viii) graduates from military or police academies, as they would typically be outside of the traditional labor market. 36 We define accreditation status by status on October 1, 2014, i.e., the day SPP was announced.
Moreover, there is a significant gap between earnings from private and public accredited college graduates that stays roughly constant across time (Panel B). Although the correlation depicted in Figure 17 cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of college type on earnings, we can use it to feed our back-of-the-envelope calculation of the benefits of SPP for Pilos. Thus, moving a college graduate from non-accredited to accredited education might raise earnings by an annuity of 2,455,573 pesos (USD 774) for forty years for a net present value of around 127.3 million pesos (USD 21,172) at a 5 percent interest rate.
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Moreover, moving a college graduate from non-accredited to private accredited education raises earnings by an annuity of 3,941,820 pesos (USD 1,242) for forty years for a net present value of around 174.4 million pesos (USD 29,482) at a 5 percent interest rate. 38 Note that these returns reflect not only higher wages, but also lower unemployment and informality rates.
These back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that SPP's costs are more than offset by the increased earnings. The private internal rate of return of SPP is 44.5 percent, while the social rate of return -which takes into account the opportunity cost of other social investments, an expanded income tax base, positive externalities from an educated workforce, lower public spending on subsidized healthcare, and lower crime rates (see Appendix B)-is 16.1 percent.
Granted, this is a highly simplistic analysis. A more careful analysis would include the potential societal gains from promoting class diversity at elite colleges, the positive peer effects at private accredited institutions (and potentially negative peer effects at non-accredited and public accredited institutions), as well as the wage loss of displaced marginal applicants from 37 We multiply OLE's monthly averages by twelve to obtain annual estimates. 38 These calculations assume wages stabilize after the ninth year of experience.
not attending top elite schools. 3940 We leave that exercise for future work.
Conclusions
The Colombian higher education system is characterized by a severe segregation due to costly tuition fees and a dearth of financial support for low-SES students. In this context, we explore the intended and unintended consequences of a recent large-scale financial aid program for the poor. We exploit sharp eligibility rules in household wealth and standardized test scores to identify the causal effect of financial aid on postsecondary enrollment and academic performance. We find large positive effects on postsecondary enrollment on both the extensive and intensive margins. Immediate enrollment doubled among eligible students, making the SES gap in enrollment disappear among top students. At the intensive margin, the program shifted students from low-quality institutions into higher-quality institutions (which have the largest returns to educational investment), and from public to private colleges. Moreover, we find that SPP beneficiaries are 18 percent less likely to drop out of college, although they are somewhat more likely to fail a course.
We also observe significant general equilibrium effects in secondary and postsecondary education in Colombia. The program promoted class diversity at top private schools, and significantly raised student quality at these institutions (with a smaller loss in low-quality and possibly public high-quality institutions). Demand for top private education shifted rightward, driving admission rates downward and increasing entry competition at these institutions, thus raising stratification by ability. However, program beneficiaries did not fully crowd out high-SES students from top private schools because supply of private and accredited college education also expanded. Finally, the program seems to have raised high school exit test performance among recent cohorts with relatively poor backgrounds.
Our cost-benefit analysis suggests the program had large positive net social gains. However, we caution that our analysis is necessarily speculative, as the only way to be sure of SPP's longrun effects is to directly measure long-run outcomes for SPP participants. This is particularly important in light of recent evidence for developing countries suggesting elite college education generates high-end labor market outcomes only for students from wealthy families (Jia and Li, 2017; Zimmerman, 2016) , although evidence for Colombia suggests lower-SES students benefit disproportionately from attending Bogota's flagship private university (Saavedra, 2009) . Thus, it is imperative that future research evaluate the impact this program will have on social mobility and explore its effects on longer-term outcomes such as college exit test scores, employment probabilities, and earnings, when such outcomes become available. Note: Column (1) restricts the sample to SISBEN-eligible students, uses SABER 11 as the running variable, and includes dummies for mothers higher education and stratum 4 as controls. Column (2) restricts the sample to SABER 11-eligible students, uses SISBEN as the running variable, and controls for family size, parental secondary and higher education, morning school schedule and weekend school schedule. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Sources: Authors' calculations based on ICFES, DNP, and MEN (2016). 
(8)
(10) Notes: All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Source: Authors' calculations based on ICFES, DNP, and MEN (2016). 
(10) Notes: All results estimated with package rddensity (Cattaneo et al., 2016a ) using an unrestricted model and a triangular kernel function, and employing the jackknife standard errors estimator. Column (1) restricts the sample to SISBEN-eligible individuals.
Column (2) 
4,265
Notes: The running variable is SABER 11 score in columns (1)- (4), and SISBEN score in columns (5)- (8). Columns (1)- (4) include dummies for mother's education and stratum 4 as controls, and columns (5)- (8) include controls for family size and dummies for parental secondary and higher education, morning school schedule and weekend school schedule. All results estimated with package rdrobust (Cattaneo et al., 2014 ). * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Sources: Authors' calculations based on ICFES, DNP, MEN, and SPADIES (2016). 
